



World Justice
Project

The Rule of Law in Mali

Key Findings from the Qualified
Respondents' Questionnaires and
General Population Poll

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I

About this Report

About this Report

STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW is an important objective for governments, donors, and civil society organizations around the world. To be effective, however, strengthening the rule of law requires clarity about the fundamental features of the rule of law, as well as an adequate basis for its evaluation and measurement. This report presents select findings drawn from two original data sources collected by the World Justice Project: a series of Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires and the General Population Poll.

As an overview of the country's rule of law situation, this report presents Mali's country profile from the *WJP Rule of Law Index*® 2020, which aggregates data from both the Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (QRQs) and the General Population Poll (GPP). The profile presents Mali's ranking and scores for each of the *WJP Rule of Law Index*'s factors and sub-factors, and draws comparisons between Mali's scores and the scores of other indexed countries in the same regional and income groups. In order to provide a more in-depth view of the data underlying Mali's *WJP Rule of Law Index* scores, this report also presents question-level data from the QRQs and the GPP that can provide more insights on the country's performance across various dimensions of the rule of law.

This report represents the voices of people in Mali and their experiences with the rule of law in their country.

Question-level data from the Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires are organized into several thematic dashboards in this report to highlight the performance of the civil and criminal justice systems in Mali. These dashboards provide insight into how each Factor score is calculated in the *WJP Rule of Law Index* by breaking down Factors 7 and 8 into their sub-factor, sub-sub-factor, and question-level components. The QRQs are administered online to in-country practitioners and academics with expertise in civil and commercial law; constitutional law, civil liberties, and criminal law; labor law; and public health. These questionnaires gather timely input on a range of topics from practitioners who frequently interact with state institutions. Such topics include information on the efficacy of courts, the strength of regulatory enforcement, and the reliability of accountability mechanisms. In total, 35 expert practitioners completed the QRQ in Mali in 2019.

The data derived from the General Population Poll are presented in this report as ten thematic briefs, each one highlighting a different facet of the rule of law from the perspective of Malians. These briefs touch upon issues of accountability, corruption, fundamental freedoms, crime, criminal justice, police performance, dispute resolution, and trust. The thematic briefs are designed to call attention to governance issues in Mali from the perspective of the people, while simultaneously illuminating comparisons across the following peer countries: Ghana, Kenya, Niger, and Nigeria. These peer countries have been selected for this report because they are the Sub-Saharan African countries included in the Security Governance Initiative (SGI).¹ The General Population Poll was conducted through face-to-face interviews in 1,012 nationally representative households in Mali in 2018. This poll was designed to capture data on the experiences and perceptions of ordinary people regarding a variety of themes related to the rule of law.

¹ The Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is a US-government initiative to improve security sector governance to address transnational threats in the form of violent extremism, illicit trade and trafficking, and other regional conflicts. The project was designed to support security sector initiatives in target countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Executive Findings

1 Corruption is the greatest challenge to civil justice in Mali, in particular improper government influence.

While Mali sees moderate performance across most dimensions of the Civil Justice factor, it lags severely behind in sub-factor 7.3 on absence of corruption. A closer look at the question-level data in Chart 2b shows that this poor performance is largely driven by expert practitioners' negative views on the extent to which court decisions are influenced by pressure or corruption, though general perceptions of corruption and views on the pervasiveness of bribery are also quite negative.

These views are reflected in the perceptions and experiences of the general public, as judges and magistrates are perceived as the second to most corrupt state actors in Mali (see Chart 6) and courts the least trusted institution (see Chart 14). These views are also important in light of the fact that only 7% of Malians take their civil and administrative disputes to courts, a government body, or the police for help better understanding or resolving their problem (see Chart 13).

2 When it comes to accessibility of dispute resolution, the public's awareness of available remedies is a challenge.

Mali lags slightly behind its regional and income peers in sub-factor 7.1 on accessibility and affordability of civil justice. A closer look at the sub-sub factor level data in Chart 2b reveals that people's awareness of available remedies is a significant challenge, with experts having extremely negative views on the extent to which the public is aware of formal justice mechanisms for resolving disputes and has access to information on court procedures.

When viewed from the perspective of ordinary people in Mali, Chart 13 reveals that while about half of Malians with legal problems feel that they can access advice and information and obtain expert help to resolve their disputes, very few actually turn to any professional advisors for help. With less than a quarter of Malians experiencing legal problems reporting that they were fully resolved, this lack of professional support may point to an important access barrier.

3 Corruption and improper government influence are the greatest challenges to criminal justice in Mali.

Similar to its performance in Civil Justice, Mali lags the furthest behind its regional and income peers when it comes to absence of corruption and improper

government influence, as reflected in sub-factor scores 8.5 and 8.6. A closer look at the question-level variables in Chart 3b show us that this is driven by expert practitioners' extremely negative views regarding the extent to which court decisions are influenced by corruption or powerful private interests under sub-sub factor 8.5.2, as well as the extent to which the judiciary operates with independence from the government's power under sub-factor 8.6.

As stated in Finding #1 above, these views are also reflected in the perceptions and experiences of the general public, with judges and magistrates perceived as the second to most corrupt state actors in Mali (see Chart 6) and with courts being the least trusted institution (see Chart 14).

4 While experts perceive prosecutors as generally corrupt, the extent of corruption varies by step of the criminal investigation process.

When asked broadly whether prosecutors in Mali engage in corrupt practices, expert respondents have very negative views (see Chart 4). Looking closely at the question-level data, however, certain actions are more likely to be influenced by bribery than others. For instance, experts report that prosecutors are more likely to request or receive bribes to drop charges, grant bail, and expedite court processes than they are to request or receive bribes in order to investigate a crime or prosecute a criminal.

5 Inmate living conditions are the greatest challenge facing correctional institutions.

While Mali's correctional system faces a number of challenges, the question-level data on correctional institutions in Chart 4 reveal that the greatest challenges relate to conditions for inmates, namely living conditions and space, healthcare and nutrition, and physical abuse by guards.

6 Criminal investigations are impeded by inadequate technology, resources, and eyewitness identification methods.

Although experts have negative views on a number of issues related to criminal investigations, they point to a few areas where performance is particularly poor, as illustrated in Chart 4. These include eyewitness identification methods that improperly disadvantage the accused, sufficient technology and resources for criminal investigations, and systems for exchanging information between criminal investigative service agencies.

7 Malians perceive police as corrupt, but unlikely to engage in discriminatory practices. As with many other actors and institutions in Mali's criminal justice system, police are perceived as corrupt by expert practitioners, in particular when it comes to requesting and accepting bribes from small businesses or to drop charges or grant bail (see Chart 3b). These views are also reflected in a number of other questions asked to the general public. Malians view police as the most corrupt actor (see Chart 6) and the second to least trusted institution in the country (see Chart 14), and few Malians believe that police are punished for violating the law (see Chart 11a). These perceptions are supported by the fact that more than half of those stopped by the police in Mali report being asked to pay a bribe (see Chart 12b).

In contrast, views are more positive when it comes to absence of discrimination by police. While expert practitioners believe that discrimination on the basis of socio-economic status is a problem, they report that police discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and religion is much less likely. As noted in Chart 3b, these same questions are asked to the general population, with even more positive results. Moreover, more than half of Malians believe that victims seeking justice receive equal treatment regardless of who they are (see Chart 10), pointing to more positive perceptions among the general public as compared to expert practitioners.

8 Timeliness and pre-trial detention are greater challenges to Mali's criminal justice system than the quality of criminal court decisions. Mali's score for sub-factor 8.7 on due process of law lags behind its regional and income peers (see country profile). Despite the sub-factor's poor performance overall, expert practitioners had more moderate views on the extent to which criminal courts accurately indict perpetrators and convict individuals through trials, plea bargains, or other pre-trial processes (see Chart 4). However, practitioners' views are much more negative when it comes to the timeliness of court decisions and excessive use of pre-trial detention, as reflected in the lower scores for sub-factor 8.2 on timely and effective adjudication.

9 Public defenders are perceived as competent but inadequate in number. Questions pertaining to public defenders receive positive scores relative to other criminal

justice institutions and actors in Mali (see Chart 4). Most notably, expert practitioners have positive views on the extent to which state-provided pro-bono attorneys perform their duties competently and are able to gain access to clients in custody. However, their views are considerably more negative when asked whether the criminal defense system has an adequate number of state-provided and pro-bono attorneys.

10 Civil conflict is the greatest challenge to order and security in Mali. In the last year, Mali saw a statistically significant drop in its performance for Factor 5 on Order and Security, driven largely by its performance in sub-factor 5.2 on absence of civil conflict (see country profile). These scores have declined due to an increase in the number of battle related deaths and casualties, as reported by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Mali is more or less on par with its regional and income peers when it comes to the other dimensions of order and security, with one in six Malians reporting that they experienced a crime in the last year (see Chart 9a).

11 Lack of sanctions for official misconduct undermine checks and balances. Within Factor 1 on Constraints on Government Powers, Mali outperforms its peers in a number of dimensions such as limits by the legislature, non-governmental checks, and lawful transition of power (see country profile). However, Mali lags behind when it comes to sanctions for official misconduct. As illustrated in Chart 5a, respondents in Mali believe that misconduct by a high-ranking government officer will be completely ignored by the authorities at higher rates than in other peer countries. Interestingly, Chart 5b reveals that Malians are more likely than respondents in peer countries to agree with statements that grant more power and less accountability to the executive.

12 Freedom of religion, association, and expression are strong relative to peer countries. This is evident in Mali's good performance relative to its peers in sub-factors 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 of the *WJP Rule of Law Index* (see country profile). The general public feels particularly positive that the freedom to join any political party and the freedom for the media to express opinions against the government are effectively guaranteed in Mali (see Chart 8a).



section

II

WJP Rule of Law Index Country Profile

How to Read the Country Profile

This section presents the country profile for Mali as included in the *WJP Rule of Law Index® 2020* report.

The profile presents scores for each of the WJP Rule of Law Index's factors and sub-factors, and draws comparisons between the scores of the featured country and the scores of other indexed countries in the same regional and income groups. Scores range from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies the highest possible score (strong adherence to rule of law) and 0 signifies the lowest possible score (weak adherence to rule of law). The country profiles consist of four sections, outlined below.

Section 1: Displays the country's overall rule of law score; its overall global, income, and regional ranks.


Section 2: Displays the country's individual factor scores, along with its global, regional, and income group rankings. The global, regional, and income rankings are distributed across three tiers—high, medium, and low—as indicated by the color of the box where the score is found.

Section 3: Displays the country's disaggregated scores for each of the sub-factors that compose the *WJP Rule of Law Index*.

The country's score is represented by the purple bar and labeled at the end of the bar. The average score of the country's region is represented by the orange line. The average score of the country's income group is represented by the green line.

Mali









Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
Income Group: Low



Section 4: Presents the individual sub-factor scores underlying each of the factors listed in Section 3 of the country profile.


Each of the 44 sub-factors is represented by a purple line drawn from the center to the periphery of the circle. The center of the circle corresponds to the worst possible score for each sub-factor (0), and the outer edge of the circle marks the best possible score for each sub-factor (1).

Overall Score	Regional Rank	Income Rank	Global Rank
0.44	21/31	13/19	106/128
Score Change	Rank Change		
-0.01 ▾	-2 ▾		


	Factor Score	Score Change	Regional Rank	Income Rank	Global Rank
 Constraints on Government Powers	0.47	-0.01	17/31	10/19	86/128
 Absence of Corruption	0.34	0.03	21/31	13/19	107/128
 Open Government	0.46	0.02	11/31	6/19	83/128
 Fundamental Rights	0.54	0.01	11/31	5/19	71/128
 Order and Security	0.51	-0.1*	28/31	17/19	122/128
 Regulatory Enforcement	0.49	-0.05	10/31	4/19	70/128
 Civil Justice	0.42	-0.01	26/31	15/19	111/128
 Criminal Justice	0.30	0.02	29/31	18/19	120/128

* Indicates statistically significant change at the 10 percent level

Low Medium High



Mali Sub-Saharan Africa Low



section

III


Thematic Findings from Expert Practitioners

Calculating WJP Rule of Law Index Scores

Guidance on building aggregate WJP Rule of Law Index scores and using the Factor Dashboards.

Chart 1a. Building Aggregate WJP Rule of Law Index Scores


WJP Rule of Law Index scores are constructed by aggregating data from more than 500 questions asked to expert practitioners and the general public in each country. The figure below provides an overview of the method followed to aggregate WJP's survey data to produce these scores.



**Not all sub-factors contain sub-sub factors. In these cases, question-level scores are averaged to produce sub-factor scores.*
† Question-level scores may have different weights.

Chart 1b. How to Read the Factor Dashboards

The pages that follow provide detailed information on the questions administered in Mali to collect data on civil justice and criminal justice, and used to produce scores on these dimensions – or “factors” – of the rule of law. The overview below provides an example of how the question-level scores from the survey data are aggregated into scores at the sub-sub factor, sub-factor, and factor levels. Scores range from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies the highest possible score. Unless otherwise indicated, data on civil and criminal justice come from expert practitioners in Mali.



Civil Justice Factor Dashboard

Data on the extent to which people can resolve their grievances peacefully and effectively through the civil justice system in Mali.

Chart 2a. Overview of Civil Justice Scores

Overview of Civil Justice scores at the factor, sub-factor, and sub-sub factor levels for Mali. Scores range from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies the highest possible score





Chart 2b. Question-Level Variables on Civil Justice


Aggregation of question-level variables used to construct Mali's WJP Rule of Law Index score for the Civil Justice factor. Unless otherwise indicated, data come from expert practitioners in Mali.



* Question-level variables may have different weights.
Source: WJP Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (unless otherwise noted).

Mali's performance for Factor 7 on Civil Justice is mixed. While expert respondents report that civil, commercial, and labor law cases are adjudicated and decisions are enforced in a timely manner – reflected in higher scores for sub-sub factors 7.5.1 and 7.6.2 – they also note that court proceedings are heavily affected by improper influence. Sub-factor 7.3, measuring corruption in the civil justice system, received the lowest score out of the 44 sub-factors used to calculate the Index's country rankings. Mali's low score in this sub factor is linked to questions about bribing judges, court personnel, and civil adjudicators (7.3.1) as well as the effect of corruption on final court decisions (7.3.2).




Civil justice is free of discrimination

7.2  0.45


Civil and commercial courts do not discriminate on the basis of socio-economic status.	0.05
Civil and commercial courts do not discriminate on the basis of gender.	0.59
Civil and commercial courts do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity.	0.64
Civil and commercial courts do not discriminate on the basis of religion.	0.65
Civil and commercial courts do not discriminate on the basis of national origin.	0.56
Civil and commercial courts do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.	0.43
People do not face bias or discrimination in civil courts.	0.24

Civil justice is free of corruption

7.3  0.14

Absence of bribery	
7.3.1 	0.19
Judges and magistrates do not request bribes in civil or commercial cases.	0.14
Court personnel do not request bribes in civil or commercial court cases.	0.16
Commercial arbitrators do not request bribes in civil or commercial court cases.	0.30
People do not perceive judges and judicial officers to be corrupt.	0.13
Civil court judges and judicial officers are not corrupt.	0.21
People and private companies do not have to pay bribes or other inducements to expedite court processes.	0.21
Labor inspectors do not request bribes in labor court cases.	0.17
Absence of improper influence by powerful private interests	
7.3.2 	0.09
In civil cases between private parties decided by trial courts, the final decisions reflect the judges' honest evaluation of the available evidence and applicable law.	0.11
In civil cases between private parties decided by trial courts, the final decisions are not influenced by undue pressure from either party or influenced by corruption.	0.04
 Judges decide civil cases according to what the law says.	0.10



Civil justice is free of undue government influence

7.4  0.42


The government does not exercise undue influence to affect the outcome of cases in which it has an interest.	0.32
Homeowners who sue the government in court over the demolition of their homes receive fair compensation.	0.61
The government always obeys the decisions of the high courts, even when they disagree.	0.40
National courts are free of political influence.	0.35
Local courts are free of political influence.	0.40



Civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delays

7.5  0.56

Timely adjudication	
7.5.1 	0.83
Proceedings and judgments in civil and commercial court lawsuits are conducted in a timely manner.	0.91
Proceedings and judgments in small claims court or before a magistrate are conducted in a timely manner.	0.81
Civil cases tried in local courts are decided and enforced in a timely manner.	0.77
Perceptions of timeliness	
7.5.2 	0.29
The public perceives civil courts to be timely.	0.24
Civil and commercial courts decide cases on a timely basis.	0.35





Civil justice is effectively enforced

7.6  0.44

Quality of enforcement mechanisms	
7.6.1 	0.27
Civil and commercial courts have efficient enforcement mechanisms.	0.27
Timely enforcement of decisions	
7.6.2 	0.61
The winning party of a civil or commercial lawsuit is able to enforce the decision and collect compensation in a timely manner.	0.50
The winning party of a civil or commercial lawsuit is able to enforce the decision and collect compensation in a timely manner.	0.71

Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRs) are accessible, impartial, and effective

7.7  0.50

ADRs are accessible	
7.7.1 	0.62
A plaintiff using a commercial arbitration mechanism can access justice without incurring unreasonable fees.	0.62
ADRs are free of improper influence	
7.7.2 	0.30
Commercial arbitrators do not request bribes in civil or commercial court cases.	0.30
ADRs are efficient	
7.7.3 	0.57
Commercial arbitration proceedings are conducted in a timely manner.	0.54
The winning party of a commercial arbitration proceeding is able to enforce the decision and collect compensation in a timely manner.	0.60
ADR decisions are effectively enforced	
7.7.4 	0.53
Contractors are able to use local courts to enforce decisions against government agencies made by a national arbitration panel.	0.42
Contractors are able to use local courts to enforce decisions against government agencies made by a international arbitration panel.	0.64

* Question-level variables may have different weights.

Source: WJP Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (unless otherwise noted).

Criminal Justice Factor Dashboard

Data on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in Mali in redressing grievances and offenses against society.

Chart 3a. Overview of Criminal Justice Scores

Overview of Criminal Justice scores at the factor, sub-factor, and sub-sub factor levels for Mali. Scores range from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies the highest possible score.





Chart 3b. Question-Level Variables on Criminal Justice

Aggregation of question-level variables used to construct Mali's WJP Rule of Law Index score for the Criminal Justice factor. Unless otherwise indicated, data come from expert practitioners in Mali.



General Population Poll Data

Criminal investigation system is effective

8.1 0.25



Quality of investigation and conviction processes	
8.1.1	0.35
The criminal investigation system has effective intelligence systems to support criminal investigators.	0.33
Criminal investigations utilize proactive investigation methods.	0.30
Criminal investigations have effective mechanisms to gather information and analyze evidence.	0.32
Criminal investigations follow effective storage and chain of custody procedures for material evidence.	0.22
Criminal investigations have effective systems to protect witnesses and whistle-blowers.	0.25
Criminal investigations have effective systems to exchange information between criminal investigative service agencies.	0.18
The criminal investigation system has an adequate number of criminal investigators.	0.22
Criminal investigators perform their duties competently.	0.27
Criminal investigations are equipped with sufficient technology and adequate resources.	0.12
Criminal investigators and judicial police are not corrupt.	0.11
Criminal investigators have a proper understanding of the law.	0.22
Forensic experts perform their duties independently and free of improper influence.	0.27
Eyewitness identification of defendants is conducted in a manner that does not improperly disadvantage the accused.	0.12
Prosecutors are not corrupt.	0.11
Prosecutors have a proper understanding of the law.	0.34
Prosecutors receive adequate training and/or education to perform their duties.	0.30
The prosecutorial system has an adequate number of prosecutors to handle caseloads.	0.26
Prosecutors operate independently from powerful government officials and private parties.	0.21
The criminal justice system accurately indicts and accuses perpetrators.	0.42
The criminal justice system accurately convicts individuals through trials.	0.45
The criminal justice system accurately convicts individuals through plea bargains or other pre-trial processes.	0.54
Crimes solved	
8.1.2	0.14
The criminal justice system is able to prosecute and convict perpetrators of homicide.	0.02
The criminal justice system is able to catch reported perpetrators of burglary and theft.	0.13
The criminal justice system is able to catch reported perpetrators of armed robbery.	0.27

* Question-level variables may have different weights.
† Question no longer included in the General Population Poll. Values are imputed based on average values of regional and income peers polled in 2016 and 2017.
Source: WJP Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (unless otherwise noted).

Mali's Criminal Justice Factor Dashboard provides additional insights into the country's Factor 8 performance, where Mali received its lowest scores. Overall, expert respondents report the criminal investigation and criminal adjudication systems to be largely ineffective due to a lack of resources, adequate personnel, and delays. This is reflected in sub-factor scores 8.1 and 8.2, respectively. Question-level data reveal additional challenges faced by Mali's criminal justice system, including corruption of judges and judicial officers, bias against marginalized people, and conditions in correctional facilities, all of which is captured in sub-sub factors 8.5.2, 8.4.2, and 8.7.5, respectively. Despite low scores in these sub-sub factors, experts are more confident that the police are impartial and do not discriminate (8.4.1) and report that legal assistance is accessible to defendants who need it (8.7.4).



Criminal adjudication system is timely and effective

8.2  0.30


Timeliness of criminal adjudication		
8.2.1		0.34
	Suspected perpetrators of serious crimes are convicted in a timely manner.	0.37
	Suspected perpetrators of minor crimes are convicted in a timely manner.	0.71
	Detained suspects are not held in custody without a formal conviction for more than three months.	0.17
	Detained suspects are not held in custody without a formal conviction for more than one year.	0.44
	Detained suspects are not held in custody without a formal conviction for more than three years.	0.54
	Criminal courts do not use pre-trial detention excessively.	0.04
	Criminal courts decide cases on a timely basis.	0.12
Effective prosecution and punishment		
8.2.2		0.26
	Criminal court judges make sound decisions.	0.16
†	Perpetrators caught breaking and entering are prosecuted and punished for their crimes.	0.67
†	Perpetrators of homicide are prosecuted and punished for their crimes.	0.50
†	Perpetrators of armed robberies are prosecuted and punished for their crimes.	0.27
🏠	Perpetrators of homicide are prosecuted and punished for their crimes.	0.02

Criminal system is free of discrimination

8.4  0.34

Police are impartial and do not discriminate		
8.4.1		0.59
	Police do not discriminate on the basis of socio-economic status.	0.20
	Police do not discriminate on the basis of gender.	0.65
	Police do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity.	0.61
	Police do not discriminate on the basis of religion.	0.68
	Police do not discriminate on the basis of national origin.	0.56
	Police do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.	0.44
🏠	Police do not discriminate on the basis of socio-economic status.	0.51
🏠	Police do not discriminate on the basis of gender.	0.54
🏠	Police do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity.	0.65
🏠	Police do not discriminate on the basis of religion.	0.69
🏠	Police do not discriminate on the basis of national origin.	0.84
🏠	Police do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.	0.68
Judges are impartial and do not discriminate		
8.4.2		0.10
	Criminal courts do not discriminate against marginalized people.	0.10

Correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior

8.3  0.30


	Correctional facilities provide adequate living conditions and space for inmates.	0.03
	Correctional facilities effectively rehabilitate inmates and prevent recidivism.	0.19
	Correctional institutions provide separate facilities for dangerous and less serious offenders.	0.38
	Correctional facilities have adequate security measures to prevent escapes.	0.30
	Convicted criminals released from prison do not relapse into criminal behavior.	0.59

* Question-level variables may have different weights.

† Question no longer included in the General Population Poll. Values are imputed based on average values of regional and income peers polled in 2016 and 2017.

Source: WJP Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (unless otherwise noted).

The criminal system is free of corruption

8.5  0.27


Police, military, and prosecutors are free of improper influence	
8.5.1 	0.38
The police are not influenced by criminal organizations.	0.36
The military is not influenced by criminal organizations.	0.60
Local police officers do not request bribes from traders and small merchants to carry on their business activities.	0.11
The police do not accept bribes from criminal organizations in exchange for impunity.	0.27
Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to investigate a crime.	0.36
Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to prosecute criminals.	0.27
Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to drop charges or grant bail.	0.13
Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to destroy or tamper with evidence.	0.44
Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to expedite court processes.	0.37
Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to investigate a crime.	0.54
Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to drop charges or grant bail.	0.29
Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to destroy or tamper with evidence.	0.54
Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to expedite court processes.	0.47
Criminal investigators and judicial police are not corrupt.	0.11
Prosecutors are not corrupt.	0.11
 Police officers are not involved in corrupt practices	0.43
Judges are free of improper influence	
8.5.2 	0.16
Members of the courts are not influenced by criminal organizations.	0.35
Criminal court judges and judicial officers are not corrupt.	0.03
Final decisions in criminal court cases are not influenced by undue political or professional pressure.	0.19
Final decisions in criminal court cases are not influenced by corruption.	0.11
 Judges and magistrates are not corrupt.	0.22
 Judges decide criminal court cases without improper influence by the government or powerful private interests.	0.10



The criminal system is free of improper government influence

8.6  0.25

National courts are free of political influence in their application of power.	0.27
Local courts are free of political influence in their application of power.	0.36
The judiciary operates with independence from the government's power.	0.11

Due process of law and rights of the accused

8.7  0.37

Presumption of innocence and adequate evidence	
8.7.1 	0.40
Suspects are presumed innocent by judges during trial until all evidence has been presented.	0.40
Suspects are presumed innocent during criminal investigations.	0.32
The criminal justice system accurately convicts individuals through trials.	0.45
The criminal justice system accurately convicts individuals through plea bargains or other pre-trial processes.	0.54
The criminal justice system accurately indicts and accuses perpetrators.	0.42
Police officers do not arrest innocent people on false charges in order to solicit bribes or fill quotas.	0.44
Prosecutors do not indict innocent people of false charges in order to fill quotas.	0.33
Suspects are allowed to challenge the evidence used against them in court.	0.30
Appropriate arrest and pre-trial detention procedures	
8.7.2 	0.39
Detained suspects are not held in custody without an indictment or formal conviction for more than three months.	0.59
Detained suspects are not held in custody without an indictment or a formal conviction for more than one year.	0.73
Detained suspects are not held in custody without an indictment or formal conviction for more than three years.	0.75
Detained suspects are not held in custody indefinitely without an indictment or formal conviction.	0.87
Police do not arbitrarily arrest citizens without probable cause.	0.17
Police do not use excessive force during arrests.	0.13
The police do not search houses of political dissidents without a warrant of arrest.	0.38
Suspects are made aware of the charges against them.	0.33
 The basic rights of suspects are respected by the police.	0.29
Absence of torture and abusive treatment towards suspects	
8.7.3 	0.34
Police interrogators do not inflict minor physical harm on detained suspects to force a confession.	0.26
Police interrogators do not inflict severe physical harm on detained suspects to force a confession.	0.29
Police (or military police) do not inflict severe physical harm on suspected members of dangerous criminal organizations during interrogation.	0.39
Suspected perpetrators of common crimes are not forced to confess to their alleged crimes.	0.44

* Question-level variables may have different weights.

Source: WJP Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (unless otherwise noted).

8.7 Due process of law and rights of the accused (Continued)

Accessibility of legal assistance		
8.7.4	<div><div></div></div>	0.54
	Detained suspects are granted adequate legal counsel from public defenders upon request while in police custody.	0.36
	Detained suspects are granted adequate legal counsel from public defenders upon request while in pre-trial detention.	0.40
	Detained suspects are granted adequate legal counsel from public defenders upon request during their trial.	0.60
	State-provided and pro-bono attorneys receive adequate training and education to perform their duties.	0.60
	The criminal defense system has an adequate number of state-provided and pro-bono attorneys to handle poor criminal defendants' cases.	0.22
	State-provided and pro-bono attorneys perform their duties competently.	0.68
	State-provided and pro-bono attorneys are able to gain access to clients while they are detained.	0.79
	Detained suspects that do not speak the same language as police officers or prosecutors are able to obtain access to an interpreter.	0.64
Rights of prisoners		
8.7.5	<div><div></div></div>	0.16
	Correctional facilities provide adequate living conditions and space for inmates.	0.03
	Correctional facilities provide inmates with adequate health care and nutrition.	0.06
	Guards and correctional personnel do not physically abuse inmates.	0.16
	There is not physical abuse between inmates in correctional facilities.	0.28
	Correctional institutions have accessible complaint mechanisms.	0.26

* Question-level variables may have different weights.


Source: WJP Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (unless otherwise noted).

Criminal Justice Institutions

Data on the functioning of criminal justice institutions in Mali.

Chart 4.

Question-level variables organized by criminal justice institution or actor. The first column notes where each question maps into Mali's Criminal Justice score. Question-level scores range from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies the highest possible score.



🏠 General Population Poll Data

Prosecutors

Capacity		
8.1.1	Prosecutors have a proper understanding of the law.	0.34
8.1.1	Prosecutors receive adequate training and/or education to perform their duties.	0.30
8.1.1	The prosecutorial system has an adequate number of prosecutors to handle caseloads.	0.26
Corruption		
8.5.1	Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to investigate a crime.	0.54
8.5.1	Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to drop charges or grant bail.	0.29
8.5.1	Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to destroy or tamper with evidence.	0.54
8.5.1	Prosecutors do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to expedite court processes.	0.47
8.1.1	Prosecutors are not corrupt.	0.11
8.5.1	Prosecutors are not corrupt.	0.11
Independence		
8.1.1	Prosecutors operate independently from powerful government officials and private parties.	0.21
Performance & Due Process		
8.7.1	Prosecutors do not indict innocent people of false charges in order to fill quotas.	0.33
8.7.4	Detained suspects that do not speak the same language as police officers or prosecutors are able to obtain access to an interpreter.	0.64

Correctional Institutions

Capacity		
8.3	Correctional facilities provide adequate living conditions and space for inmates.	0.03
8.3	Correctional institutions provide separate facilities for dangerous and less serious offenders.	0.38
8.3	Correctional facilities have adequate security measures to prevent escapes.	0.30
8.7.5	Correctional facilities provide adequate living conditions and space for inmates.	0.03
8.7.5	Correctional facilities provide inmates with adequate health care and nutrition.	0.06
8.7.5	Correctional institutions have accessible complaint mechanisms.	0.26
Physical Safety		
8.7.5	Guards and correctional personnel do not physically abuse inmates.	0.16
8.7.5	There is not physical abuse between inmates in correctional facilities.	0.28
Resources		
8.3	Correctional facilities effectively rehabilitate inmates and prevent recidivism.	0.19
8.3	Convicted criminals released from prison do not relapse into criminal behavior.	0.59

Criminal Investigation

Corruption		
8.1.1	Criminal investigators and judicial police are not corrupt.	0.11
8.5.1	Criminal investigators and judicial police are not corrupt.	0.11
Independence		
8.1.1	Forensic experts perform their duties independently and free of improper influence.	0.27
Performance & Due Process		
8.1.1	Criminal investigators perform their duties competently.	0.27
8.1.1	Eyewitness identification of defendants is conducted in a manner that does not improperly disadvantage the accused.	0.12
8.7.1	Suspects are presumed innocent during criminal investigations.	0.32
Resources		
8.1.1	Criminal investigators have a proper understanding of the law.	0.22
8.1.1	The criminal investigation system has effective intelligence systems to support criminal investigators.	0.33
8.1.1	Criminal investigations utilize proactive investigation methods.	0.30
8.1.1	Criminal investigations have effective mechanisms to gather information and analyze evidence.	0.32
8.1.1	Criminal investigations follow effective storage and chain of custody procedures for material evidence.	0.22
8.1.1	Criminal investigations have effective systems to protect witnesses and whistle-blowers.	0.25
8.1.1	Criminal investigations have effective systems to exchange information between criminal investigative service agencies.	0.18
8.1.1	The criminal investigation system has an adequate number of criminal investigators.	0.22
8.1.1	Criminal investigations are equipped with sufficient technology and adequate resources.	0.12

Judges

Corruption		
8.5.2	Criminal court judges and judicial officers are not corrupt.	0.03
8.5.2	Final decisions in criminal court cases are not influenced by corruption.	0.11
8.5.2	🏠 Judges and magistrates are not corrupt.	0.22
Independence		
8.5.2	Members of the courts are not influenced by criminal organizations.	0.35
8.5.2	Final decisions in criminal court cases are not influenced by undue political or professional pressure.	0.19
8.5.2	🏠 Judges decide criminal court cases without improper influence by the government or powerful private interests.	0.10
Performance & Due Process		
8.2.2	Criminal court judges make sound decisions.	0.16
8.7.1	Suspects are presumed innocent by judges during trial until all evidence has been presented.	0.40

Source: WJP Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (unless otherwise noted).

Expert practitioners have a generally negative view of criminal justice institutions in Mali. Corruption is widespread across institutions, with judges receiving the lowest question-level scores in this category. While still receiving low scores, prosecutors are viewed as the least corrupt of the criminal justice institutions and actors. Both the general public and legal experts perceive the police in Mali to be relatively non-discriminatory, except on the basis of socio-economic status. In contrast, expert respondents say criminal courts often discriminate against marginalized people. While respondents feel positively about the competence and accessibility of public defenders, they feel there are not enough state-provided or pro-bono attorneys to handle poor criminal defendants' cases.

Police Officers

Corruption

8.5.1	Local police officers do not request bribes from traders and small merchants to carry on their business activities.	0.11
8.5.1	Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to investigate a crime.	0.36
8.5.1	Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to prosecute criminals.	0.27
8.5.1	Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to drop charges or grant bail.	0.13
8.5.1	Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to destroy or tamper with evidence.	0.44
8.5.1	Police and court officers do not request or receive bribes or other informal payments to expedite court processes.	0.37
8.5.1	🏠 Police officers are not involved in corrupt practices	0.43

Discrimination

8.4.1	Police do not discriminate on the basis of socio-economic status.	0.20
8.4.1	Police do not discriminate on the basis of gender.	0.65
8.4.1	Police do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity.	0.61
8.4.1	Police do not discriminate on the basis of religion.	0.68
8.4.1	Police do not discriminate on the basis of national origin.	0.56
8.4.1	Police do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.	0.44
8.4.1	🏠 Police do not discriminate on the basis of socio-economic status.	0.51
8.4.1	🏠 Police do not discriminate on the basis of gender.	0.54
8.4.1	🏠 Police do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity.	0.65
8.4.1	🏠 Police do not discriminate on the basis of religion.	0.69
8.4.1	🏠 Police do not discriminate on the basis of national origin.	0.84
8.4.1	🏠 Police do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.	0.68

Independence

8.5.1	The police do not accept bribes from criminal organizations in exchange for impunity.	0.27
8.5.1	The police are not influenced by criminal organizations.	0.36

Performance & Due Process

8.7.2	Police do not arbitrarily arrest citizens without probable cause.	0.17
8.7.2	The police do not search houses of political dissidents without a warrant of arrest.	0.38
8.7.2	🏠 The basic rights of suspects are respected by the police.	0.29
8.7.4	Detained suspects are granted adequate legal counsel from public defenders upon request while in police custody.	0.36
8.7.4	Detained suspects that do not speak the same language as police officers or prosecutors are able to obtain access to an interpreter.	0.64

Physical Safety

8.7.2	Police do not use excessive force during arrests.	0.13
8.7.3	Police interrogators do not inflict minor physical harm on detained suspects to force a confession.	0.26
8.7.3	Police interrogators do not inflict severe physical harm on detained suspects to force a confession.	0.29
8.7.3	Police (or military police) do not inflict severe physical harm on suspected members of dangerous criminal organizations during interrogation.	0.39

Criminal Courts

Independence

8.6	National courts are free of political influence in their application of power.	0.27
8.6	Local courts are free of political influence in their application of power.	0.36
8.6	The judiciary operates with independence from the government's power.	0.11

Discrimination

8.4.2	Criminal courts do not discriminate against marginalized people.	0.10
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Performance & Due Process

8.1.1	The criminal justice system accurately convicts individuals through trials.	0.45
8.1.1	The criminal justice system accurately convicts individuals through plea bargains or other pre-trial processes.	0.54
8.1.1	The criminal justice system accurately indicts and accuses perpetrators.	0.42
8.7.1	Suspects are allowed to challenge the evidence used against them in court.	0.30
8.2.1	Criminal courts do not use pre-trial detention excessively.	0.04

Timeliness

8.2.1	Suspected perpetrators of serious crimes are convicted in a timely manner.	0.37
8.2.1	Detained suspects are not held in custody without a formal conviction for more than three months.	0.17
8.2.1	Detained suspects are not held in custody without a formal conviction for more than one year.	0.44
8.2.1	Detained suspects are not held in custody without a formal conviction for more than three years.	0.54
8.2.1	Criminal courts decide cases on a timely basis.	0.12
8.2.1	Suspected perpetrators of minor crimes are convicted on a timely basis.	0.71

Public Defenders

Performance & Due Process

8.7.4	State-provided and pro-bono attorneys perform their duties competently.	0.68
8.7.4	State-provided and pro-bono attorneys are able to gain access to clients while they are detained.	0.79
8.7.4	Detained suspects are granted adequate legal counsel from public defenders upon request while in police custody.	0.36
8.7.4	Detained suspects are granted adequate legal counsel from public defenders upon request while in pre-trial detention.	0.40
8.7.4	Detained suspects are granted adequate legal counsel from public defenders upon request during their trial.	0.60

Resources

8.7.4	State-provided and pro-bono attorneys receive adequate training and education to perform their duties.	0.60
8.7.4	The criminal defense system has an adequate number of state-provided and pro-bono attorneys to handle poor criminal defendants' cases.	0.22

section


IV

Thematic Findings from the General Public

Government Accountability

Views in Mali and select peer countries regarding accountability under the law.



Chart 5a. Perceptions of Accountability in Mali and Select Peer Countries*
Most likely outcome if a high-ranking government officer is caught embezzling public funds.





There is a high perception of impunity in Mali. When presented with a hypothetical situation in which a high-ranking government officer is caught embezzling government funds (Chart 5a), only 16% of respondents believed the government officer would be prosecuted and punished. When comparing perceptions of accountability across select peer countries, more Malians believe that the accusation would be completely ignored by authorities (38%) than respondents in Ghana, Kenya, Niger, and Nigeria.

Chart 5b. Checks on Government Power
Malians' views on the relative importance of government power and accountability compared to peer country averages.

Government Accountability



Presidential Power



Adherence to Law





Chart 5b illustrates that Malians are more likely than respondents in other peer countries to agree with statements that grant more power and less accountability to the executive. When asked about their views on the importance of accountability, only 22% of Malians agree that it is more important for citizens to be able to hold a government accountable than to have a government that can get things done. This difference in opinion is more pronounced in Malians' views of presidential power - Malians are less likely to think the president should always obey the law by 16 percentage points, and more likely by 13 percentage points to think that the president should not be bound by the laws or court decisions s/he thinks are wrong.

Key

Values based on percent that agreed with statement A or B

Mali	Difference
Peer Avg.	Difference


Corruption Across Institutions

Data on perceptions of corruption across institutions in Mali and select peer countries.

Chart 6. Perceptions of Corruption in Mali and Select Peer Countries

Perceptions about the number of authorities involved in corrupt practices.

Malians believe that a moderate number of authorities are involved in corrupt practices. Members of parliament are viewed as the least corrupt authority by respondents (27%), while members of the police are perceived to be the most corrupt (50%). Across select peer countries, members of the police are also viewed as the most corrupt authority by respondents in Ghana, Kenya, Niger, and Nigeria.




Bribery Victimization

Data on bribes paid in Mali and select peer countries to access public services.

Bribery victimization is common in Mali. In the last three years, 43% of people paid a bribe in order to request a government permit or document. More than one quarter of respondents reported that they paid a bribe to enroll their child in a public school (28%) and to obtain a birth certificate or government issued ID (27%). Malians paid bribes least often to use public health services (20%). Although reported bribery victimization rates vary across peer countries, on average, more respondents reported paying a bribe to request a government permit or document than for any other service. When responses are disaggregated by gender, the data show that women and men in Mali experience bribery victimization at different rates for certain services. While male respondents are more likely to pay a bribe in order to obtain a government permit, female respondents are more likely to pay a bribe to obtain a birth certificate or government issued ID.

Chart 7. Bribery Victimization by Service
Percentage of respondents who had to pay a bribe to...



Fundamental Freedoms

Views on the extent to which various political, media, and religious freedoms are effectively guaranteed.

While the majority of Malians agree that their political, media, and religious freedoms are guaranteed, perceptions on specific freedoms within these categories vary (Chart 8a). For example, 71% of respondents agree that people in their country can join any political organization, but only 53% of respondents agree that people can express opinions against the government without fear of retaliation. Overall, people in Mali have more pessimistic views on the extent to which political, media, and religious freedoms are guaranteed when compared to the averages of these freedoms across peer countries (Chart 8b).

Chart 8a. Fundamental Freedoms in Mali

Views on specific political, media, and religious freedoms in Mali.





Chart 8b. Averages of Fundamental Freedoms

Average views on fundamental freedoms in Mali compared to those of select peer countries.



Crime Victimization

Data on crimes experienced in Mali and select peer countries.

Sixteen percent (16%) of Malians reported that they were the victim of a crime in the last year (Chart 9a). Across select peer countries, a similar percentage of respondents experienced a crime in Ghana (16%), Kenya (15%), and Nigeria (15%). The overall incidence of crime was the highest in Niger, with 23% reporting that they were the victim of a crime in the last year. When asked about the crime they most recently experienced, 10% of Malians reported that they were the victim of theft, 3% were the victim of a robbery, and 2% were the victim of a burglary (Chart 9b). Likewise, the majority of crime victims in peer countries report that the most recent crime they experienced was theft.

Chart 9a. Crime Victimization by Country

Percentage of respondents in Mali and select peer countries that experienced any crime in the last year.





Chart 9b. Most Recent Crime Experienced by Country

Most recent crimes experienced by those who were a victim of any crime in the last year.




Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System

Views on the functioning of the criminal justice system in Mali.

Malians report varying levels of confidence in the performance of the criminal justice system. The majority of respondents are confident that the criminal justice system is effective at bringing people who commit crimes to justice (60%), that the system treats those accused of crimes as innocent until proven guilty (60%), and that victims are able to seek justice regardless of who they are (61%). However, Malians are less confident that the criminal justice system is timely (45%) and that the system applies appropriate punishments for crimes committed (45%).

Chart 10. Citizen Views on Criminal Justice



Percentage of respondents who are confident that the criminal justice system...



Perceptions of the Police

Views on police accountability in Mali and select peer countries.

On average, respondents in Mali have moderate views on police accountability but slightly more positive views on police performance compared to peer countries. Roughly half of Malians believe that the police always or often perform serious investigations to find perpetrators (54%) and that the police act in accordance with the law (48%). Fewer respondents believe that the police always or often respect the basic rights of suspects (40%). Within Mali, perceptions of policy vary by region. While respondents in Bamako and Koulikoro generally feel more positive about police accountability than respondents in other regions, respondents in Tombouctou have more negative views. For example, while more than half of Malians in Bamako and Koulikoro believe that police act according to the law, only 25% of their peers in Tombouctou believe the same.



Interactions with the Police

Data on the experiences of citizens in Mali who interacted with the police in the last 12 months.

Chart 12a. Voluntary Contact with the Police*

Incidence of voluntary interactions with the police, reasons for contact, and reported experience.

Over one-third (37%) of Malians voluntarily contacted the police in the past year. Respondents contacted the police most frequently to report a crime (30%) or a case of domestic violence (25%), with the smallest percentage of Malians indicating that they contacted the police for other type of help (10%). Of the 39% of respondents who contacted the police remotely (over the phone, for example), 50% report that the police were able to solve their problem remotely. Overall, 67% of respondents who voluntarily contacted the police report that police acted in a way that was kind and respectful, and 58% were satisfied with their interaction.

37%

of respondents in Mali were voluntarily contacted by the police.

Reason for contacting the police:

30% to report a crime
25% to report a fight or domestic violence
18% to request information
17% to report an accident
10% to request other help

58%

of respondents were satisfied with their police interaction.

61%

contacted the police in person.

39%

contacted the police remotely.

50%

reported that the police solved the problem remotely.

50%

reported that the police arrived at the location if they could not solve the problem remotely.

Time for police to arrive:
45% less than 30 mins
27% 30 mins to an hour
27% more than an hour

67%

felt the police were kind and respectful.

63%

felt the police were able to control the situation.

42%

were asked for a tip, gift, or money.

*Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding
Source: WJP General Population Poll 2018

Chart 12b. Involuntary Contact with the Police*
Incidence of involuntary interactions with the police, reasons for contact, and reported experience.

Just under a third (30%) of respondents experienced involuntary contact—contact that they did not initiate—with the police in the past year. Of this, 69% were stopped in a vehicle by police, and 31% report that they were approached in their home, at work, or in a public space. For those stopped in a vehicle, the majority (64%) were stopped due to a traffic violation. Of those stopped at home, work, or in public, over half (55%) were stopped because the police thought they or a companion were doing something illegal. Overall, more Malians believed that the police acted in a kind and respectful manner during vehicle stops (59%) than during involuntary interactions that occurred at their home, work, or in public (43%).




Access to Civil Justice

Data on the paths followed by people in Mali to deal with their everyday justice problems.

Chart 13. Civil Justice Journey in Mali

Incidence of legal problems in Mali, respondents' legal capability, access to sources of help, problem status, assessment of the resolution process, and problem impact.




Trust in Institutions

Data on the extent to which citizens in Mali and select peer countries trust various groups and institutions.

Chart 14. Trust in Mali and Select Peer Countries

How much trust do citizens have in...





section

V

Project Design

Methodology

Data Sources

To present an image that accurately portrays the rule of law as experienced by ordinary people, the findings of this report are drawn from two original data sources collected by the World Justice Project in Mali: a series of Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (QRQs) and a General Population Poll (GPP). These two data sources collect up-to-date firsthand information that is not available at the global level, and constitute the world's most comprehensive dataset of its kind. They capture the experiences and perceptions of ordinary citizens and in-country practitioners concerning the performance of the state and its agents and the actual operation of the legal framework in their country.

Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires

The Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires (QRQs) were conducted for the *World Justice Project Rule of Law Index®* by the WJP's research team based in Washington, DC. The surveys were administered online from June 2019 through early November 2019. The QRQ surveys are conducted annually, and the questionnaires are completed by in-country professionals selected from directories of law firms, universities and colleges, research organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as through referrals from the WJP global network of practitioners, and all are vetted by WJP staff based on their expertise.

These questionnaires encompass four areas of practice— civil and commercial law, criminal and constitutional law, labor law, and public health— and gather timely input on a range of topics from practitioners who frequently interact with state institutions. Such topics include information on the efficacy of courts, the strength of regulatory enforcement, and the reliability of accountability mechanisms. The questionnaires contain closed-ended perception questions and several hypothetical scenarios with highly detailed factual assumptions aimed at ensuring comparability across countries.

The expert surveys are administered in five languages: English, French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. The QRQ data for this report include more than 3,800 surveys, which represents an average of 30 respondents per country. In Mali, a total of 35 expert practitioners completed the QRQs, with 13 practitioners completing the Civil and Commercial Law QRQ; 4 practitioners completing the Criminal and Constitutional Law QRQ; 3 practitioners completing the Labor Law QRQ; and 15 practitioners completing the Public Health QRQ.

General Population Poll

The General Population Poll in Mali was conducted for the *World Justice Project Rule of Law Index* with sampling, framework, and data processing by Marketing Support consultancy Limited based in Accra, Ghana. The survey fieldwork was conducted face-to-face between October 15th and November 30th, 2018, using a multi-stage, stratified, area cluster probability sampling design. The target population for this survey was Malians, 18 years of age or older, living in the regions of Bamako, Koulikoro, Mopti, Sikasso, and Tombouctou.

SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLE FRAME

The achieved sample size was 1,012 interviews distributed proportionally throughout the regions of Bamako, Koulikoro, Mopti, Sikasso, and Tombouctou. The sample was proportionally stratified by urbanization, gender, age, and socioeconomic status.

SAMPLING

For the sample, regions were the primary sampling unit and were sampled using probability proportionate to size sampling. Districts were the secondary sampling units and were sampled using probability proportionate to size sampling. Sectors were the tertiary sampling unit and were sampled using simple random sampling. Within the sampled sectors, a systematic random route was performed to sample households and a Kish grid was used to sample respondents.

Descriptions of the Sample

REGIONS Interviews were conducted in the regions of Bamako, Koulikoro, Mopti, Sikasso, and Tombouctou. Interviews were distributed proportionally across the regions, with 28% of interviews occurring in Sikasso, 24% in Koulikoro, 21% in Mopti, 20% in Bamako, and 8% in Tombouctou.

ETHNICITY Most respondents identified themselves as Bambara (41%), Fulani (15%), or Senufo (14%).

GENDER Fifty percent (50%) of respondents were male and 50% were female.

EDUCATION Twenty-seven percent (27%) of respondents reported that they had no formal education, 11% had an elementary school diploma, 9% had a middle school diploma, 22% had a high school diploma, and 31% had a Bachelor's degree or higher.

INTERVIEWING AND QUALITY CONTROL

A total of 29 interviewers worked on this project, including 12 female and 17 male interviewers. Training was provided to the surveyors on the administration of the questionnaire and management of the survey software. Interviews were conducted in French and Bambara. Twenty-five percent (25%) of interviews were checked using telephone call backs. Thirty percent (30%) of interviews were back-checked by the supervisory field team, and 45% of interviews were back-checked by the central office. A total of three contacts were attempted per respondent. The average length of interview was 65 minutes.

Additional Countries

This report includes comparisons to the following Sub-Saharan African countries surveyed by the World Justice Project: Ghana, Kenya, Niger, and Nigeria. These four countries are a portion of the 128 countries and jurisdictions included in the *World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020* report. The surveys are administered every two to three years to a probability sample of 1,000 respondents in the three largest cities or nationally representative sample in most countries. Detailed information regarding the methodology of the *WJP Rule of Law Index* is available at: www.worldjusticeproject.org.

The WJP Rule of Law Index

The *WJP Rule of Law Index 2020* is the latest report in an annual series measuring the rule of law based on the experiences and perceptions of the general public and in-country experts worldwide. The Index presents a portrait of the rule of law based on eight factors: Constraints on Government Powers, Absence of Corruption, Open Government, Fundamental Rights, Order and Security, Regulatory Enforcement, Civil Justice, and Criminal Justice. This year's and previous versions of the *WJP Rule of Law Index* are available online at www.worldjusticeproject.org. In addition to the Index report, an interactive online platform for *WJP Rule of Law Index* data is available at data.worldjusticeproject.org. The interactive data portal invites viewers to browse each of the 128 country profiles and explore country and factor scores. The site features the Index's entire dataset, as well as global, regional, and income group rankings.

section

VI

Appendix

Appendix

Methodological Materials

QUALIFIED RESPONDENTS' QUESTIONNAIRES (QRQS)

The Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires measure the experiences and perceptions of in-country professionals concerning the performance of the state and its agents and the actual operation of the legal framework in their country. Administered annually, the QRQs gather timely input on a range of topics, including information on the efficacy of courts, the strength of regulatory enforcement, and the reliability of accountability mechanisms.

[World Justice Project Qualified Respondents' Questionnaires 2019 – Survey Instruments](#)

GENERAL POPULATION POLL (GPP)

The General Population Poll was designed to capture high-quality data on the realities and concerns of ordinary people on a variety of themes related to the rule of law, including government accountability, bribery and corruption, crime, and access to justice.

[World Justice Project General Population Poll 2018 – Survey Instrument](#)

VARIABLES USED TO CONSTRUCT THE *WJP RULE OF LAW INDEX*®

This table lists the question-level variables from the Qualified Respondents Questionnaires and the General Population Poll used to construct the factors of the *WJP Rule of Law Index*.

[Variables Used to Construct the *WJP Rule of Law Index*](#)



World Justice
Project

About the World Justice Project

THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT® (WJP) is an independent, multidisciplinary organization working to advance the rule of law worldwide. Effective rule of law reduces corruption, combats poverty and disease, and protects people from injustices large and small. It is the foundation for communities of justice, opportunity, and peace—underpinning development, accountable government, and respect for fundamental rights.

WJP builds and supports a global, multi-disciplinary movement for the rule of law through three lines of work: collecting, organizing, and analyzing original, independent rule of law data, including the *WJP Rule of Law Index®*; supporting research, scholarship, and teaching about the importance of the rule of law, its relationship to development, and effective strategies to strengthen it; and connecting and building an engaged global network of policymakers and activists to advance the rule of law through strategic partnerships, convenings, coordinated advocacy, and support for locally led initiatives.